•Failure Review Boards have consistently pointed to lack of SE
−Space Shuttle Columbia Accident
•“Organizational causes of this accident …cultural traits …detrimental to safety …allowed to develop including: …reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices …”-CAIB, Executive
Summary
−Mars Climate orbiter (MCO)
•“…., the root cause was not caught by the processes in place in the MCO project …”-MCO Mission failure Investigation Board
−Other Recent NASA Projects:
•CDR was too high level to adequately assess design…too little time to perform an adequate assessment
•….Although training was widely available, poor requirements are still common
•“…likely cause for the failure of the parachute system was a faulty design …switches …improperly installed on a circuit board”
•“the mishap occurred mainly because of failures in NASA’s SE process….This issue is recognized within the directorate.. and is known to be the cause of several recent failures”
Defines standard
Replaced/Superseded by document(s)
Cancelled by
Amended by
| File | MIME type | Size (KB) | Language | Download | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Systems Engineering Guideline Development.pdf | application/pdf | 532.13 KB | English | DOWNLOAD! |
Provides definitions
Cover images
Introduction
Develop a NASA Systems Engineering Guideline to:
•Provide consistency across agency
•Advance practice in agency
−Take advantage of lesson’s learned from other organizations
•Address findings and results from numerous studies