The clear difference between Level 2 and Level 1 is that is possible to infer the approximate locations of the systems that transmit on the different frequencies. Knowing that certain types of equipment tend to use certain frequency ranges, and that certain types of equipment are favoured for different military
application, it is possible to further infer what is going on in the various areas of the map. None of this is beyond the wit of even the poorest funded intelligence agency to infer, so it is clearly information that needs to be protected.
The level of required protection could be kept to a minimum by simply not showing those more sensitive users of the spectrum (e.g. special forces, HUMINT operatives, electronic warfare assets, etc.). Clearly, a balance has to be struck between how much is shared and how useful the view is (if very little spectrum data is shared, the view offers little potential for spectrum de‐confliction). Post coldwar, there is an emerging consensus that there is more to be gained from sharing information than from simply protecting everything. Level 2 is clearly a case in point.
Replaced/Superseded by document(s)
This report outlines an architectural approach to managing military RF spectrum in theatre. It suggests three approaches which are similar and mutually compatible, but which are aimed at different communities with different security requirements. The starting point for this work was the Bandwidth & Frequency view in the NATO Architecture Framework (NAF revision 3). Although this view can present the usage of spectrum by different systems, it does not take into account geographic considerations, which is a primary concern for coalition operations.